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The Denver Legal Aid Society's 25th Anniversary
Every lawyer will remember that portion of the oath taken by him at the
time he was admitted to practice by the Supreme Court of Colorado which is
as follows:
"I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself,

the cause of the defenseless or oppressed .... "
Attorneys recognize that if any meaning is to be given to this solemn
declaration then it is incumbent upon them to see to it that every person who
has a just cause of action, or who is a defendant in any suit, criminal or civil,
has a lawyer capable and willing to appear on his behalf. I am sure, too, that
every attorney at law realizes that one of the chief distinctions between our
American system of government and that of totalitarian states is that we
provide and insist upon the right of every man to have his "day in court" and
to be represented by competent counsel.
It is for the reasons above stated that more than 25 years ago members
of the Denver Bar Association founded the Denver Legal Aid Society and ever
since that date have endeavored to support its aims and purposes. I sincerely
trust that in the future each lawyer will feel it his personal privilege to assist
and cooperate with the Legal Aid Society when called upon to do so.
JOHN E. GORSUCH, Chairman of the Board,
Denver Legal Aid Society.

LEGAL AID IN DENVER
HON. JOSEPH J. WALSH
President, Legal Aid Society of Denver

Freedom and equality of justice are twin fundamental conceptions of American jurisprudence. That statement by Reginald
Heber Smith, in a report on the first comprehensive survey of
legal aid more than 30 years ago, rings just as true today as then.
Legal counsel and court representation for those unable to pay
for such services are requisites in any democracy that is to survive. Legal aid, as that term is presently used, consists of an
organized effort on the part of the bar and the community to provide these services of lawyers free, or for a token charge, to persons who cannot afford to pay an attorney's fee and whose cases
are unremunerative on a contingent fee basis. It is, therefore, a
credit to both the bar and the entire community of Denver that
no worthy person who has sought legal aid in this community
during recent years has been denied advice, consultation, and adeThe first record of organized legal aid as such in this country dates from the year 1876 when Edward Saloman, a practicing lawyer in the City of New York and a former governor of
the State of Wisconsin, organized a society to assist German immigrants who were without funds to secure counsel. Thereafter,
the "Bureau of Justice" was organized in Chicago to serve all
indigent applicants. By the turn of the century Boston, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Newark had organized societies for like pur-
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poses. By 1916, 37 cities operated some form of legal aid organizations. There were 117,201 people who sought advice or other
services from the agencies then. existing. By 1949, 92 legal aid
offices providing services in civil cases were in operation throughout the United States.
An early local attempt to provide "Justice for the Poor" was
made in the year 1904 when the University of Denver School of
Law organized a "Legal Aid Dispensary" primarily to provide
practical experience for the University's law students. Considerable work was done in the matters of wage claims and nonsupport.
While this effort was successful from educational and charitable
points of view, the volume of work and administrative costs prohibited activities after the year 1910. The then Dean stated that
he found he was dispensing more money to keep the legal aid
department running than he was dividing among his entire faculty.
This, of course, led to the abolition of the legal aid department;
however, the Dean stated that he found this method excellent for
teaching the practical aspects of law.
By the year 1924, the need for an organized legal aid society
was felt in Denver and received the backing of leading members
of the bar as well as other prominent citizens. On the 25th day'
of February, 1925, the hands and seals of seven men I were affixed
to the certificate of incorporation of the Legal Aid Society of
Denver. The certificate provided that the management of the
Society was to be entrusted to a Board of Directors consisting of
25 persons. 2 The gate to the hall of justice was then opened, and
it has since been locked in that position. Year by year, an increasing number of our citizens have sought assistance at the offices
of the Society until presently, after 25 years have elapsed, the
number of applicants annually exceeds 4,000.
The embryo organization was supported through contributions
from members of the bar and from other public spirited citizens.
The worthiness of the organization was recognized by the community at large in the year 1928 when it became an agency of the
Denver Community Chest.
LEGAL SERVICES RENDERED BY STAFF, BAR, AND LAW STUDENTS

Throughout the years, individual members of the bar have
contributed great support'to the organization. Because of an extremely limited staff, the agency could not have progressed without such support. Likewise, the agency's officers, board members,
1 L. Ward Bannister, Charles C. Butler, Horace N. Hawkins, George C. Manley,
Albert A. Reed, Halsted L. Ritter, and Stanley T. Wallbank.
2L. Ward Bannister, Charles C. Butler, Tyson S. Dines, Clayton C. Dorsey, W. S.
Friedman, Charles D. Hall, Horace N. Hawkins, Mrs. Ann Hayes, Thomas Kelly, Samuel
Kohn, George C. Manley, John Mullen, James Pershing, Dr. Lillian Pollock, Albert A.
Reed, Mrs. Verner Z. Reed, Halsted L. Ritter, Jacob V. Schaetzel, Thomas Stearns,
George P. Steele, James Thomas, Stanley T. Wallbank, and Mrs. Willis Wolf. Tribute
should also be paid to the late Harry Green, whose untiring efforts contributed so much
to the success of the Society during its formative years. The long and continuous service
of Mrs. Ida Nelson also merits commendation.
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and committees have given freely of their time and counsel in
assisting staff members with various problems, policies, and procedures that inevitably confront an organization of this type.3
Nevertheless, the present smooth and business-like management
of the Legal Aid Society is due in no small measure to the able
assistance and splendid executive work of its present director,
Paul Irey, and his efficient staff consisting of John W. Patterson,
H. Joe Rawlinson, and Mrs. Barbara Freed. It can truthfully be
said that they have dedicated their services to a worthy cause and
that their compensation for the services they perform is far from
adequate.
Since court representation by staff attorneys
must of necessity be limited, prior to the adoption of the existing manual of
policies, a study was made of the experiences of similar agencies
throughout the country in an effort to make the most effective
use of available personnel. This study made clear the desirability
of utilizing to as large an extent as possible the services of members of the bar. Consequently, under existing policies, a case is
accepted by the Society only if the payment of any fee would cause
undue hardship to the applicant. On the other hand, if a partial
fee can be paid, the matter is referred to a member of the panel
of 117 attorneys who assist on a purely charitable basis. The fact
that for the year 1949 the average fee received by an attorney on
a referred case was only $17.46 again bespeaks the highest cooperation from members of the bar in counseling and representing
those who cannot strictly qualify as charitable clients.
Each year some 10 to 12 students from the University of
Denver College of Law "serve their terms" in the offices of the
Society. The students work directly under the supervision of one
of the staff attorneys. They may interview clients, draw conclusions concerning the application of the law to the factual situation, and represent clients in the Justice Courts. The students also
assist in research when necessary. This arrangement has proved
most helpful and satisfactory. From their experiences, the students benefit greatly through the confidence that they acquire in
their own abilities to "act like lawyers." From the standpoint of
the Society, the assistance from students in interviewing clients
as well as in performing other duties saves much time to staff
attorneys. The University recognizes that this training is invaluable to the students and allows them credit for the work.
The present Board of Directors and members, active and honorary, who give of
their time and thought and who are never too busy to lend a helping hand in the solution of the many problems that confront the Society during the course of a year include such outstanding citizens as: Dr. A. S. Cecchini; William Doyle; John E. Gorsuch,
Chairman; Mary C. Griffith; Charles D. Hall, Treasurer; Hon. William S. Jackson;

Dean Gordon Johnston;

Ben Lantz; Norman A. Lundstrom;

Stevens Park Kinney

(Honorary Vice President) ; Max Melville; Al G. Meyer; Dr. Arthur L. Miller; Msgr.
John R. Mulroy; Fritz Nagel (Honorary Member) ; Hon. Orie L. Phillips (Honorary

Member) ; Catherine Dines Prosser; Lon J. Putnam; Mrs. Elizabeth Quereau; Howard
Roepnack; James N. Sabin, Vice President; Joseph C. Sampson; Jacob V. Schaetzel;
Edward H.

Sherman;

John Campbell Street; Franklin A.

Thayer;

Stanley T.

bank; Harold M. Webster; Edwin J. Wittelshofer; and Rabbi Joel Zion.

Wall-
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The rapid growth of population in communities outside Denver
in adjacent counties has necessitated some arrangement with the
bar of the First Judicial District. Hundreds of persons who are
employed in the City and County of Denver, yet reside within a
county in the First Judicial District, have brought their problems
to our offices. If these clients have been without funds, and if
their actions were pending in a Denver court, assistance has been
rendered. However, the applicants have often needed representation in the courts of an adjacent county. The bar of the First
Judicial District recognized this situation and formed a Legal
Aid Committee with a panel of volunteer attorneys to serve such
applicants in their respective counties. It is felt that this committee has performed a fine service, and through its efforts the
entire Denver area is now being served. This is undoubtedly what
the Honorable Fred M. Vinson of the United States Supreme Court
had in mind when he said:
Legal Aid should not exist only in the cities; it should be extended to every part of this country to protect the rights of those who
cannot protect themselves.
NATURE OF LEGAL PROBLEMS PRESENTED

As a matter of basic policy, it has been found necessary to
place some restrictions on the type of cases handled. For example,
divorce and separate maintenance matters are not handled by
staff attorneys unless there is a definite social need or unless the
service is recommended by a member of the bar. Other family
matters, on the other hand, are readily accepted, and much time
is spent by staff attorneys in such matters as civil enforcement of
the payment of support orders. Generally real estate matters
cannot be accepted except in the defense of foreclosure and on
behalf of tenants in eviction matters. Bankruptcy problems are
not accepted or referred unless investigation shows that the applicant is harassed by threats of garnishment or other measures
which would endanger his job. Claims on behalf of a client in
excess of $100 or wage claims in excess of $200 cannot be accepted
as a matter of general practice. Personal injuries cases will not
be accepted where it may be assumed that a member of the bar
will handle them on a contingent basis.
During World War II, the Society provided counsel and legal
service for servicemen and their dependents who were unable to
retain private counsel. Again the Society is endeavoring to render
a like service, particularly in civil matters where the applicant's
problems are governed by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act as amended. In this connection, all matters concerning conveyances of real property or the drafting of wills are referred to
a member of the panel.
Very often applicants for legal assistance at the offices of
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the Society are concurrently confronted with a social problem that
can be answered only by some other branch of the community
services, public or private. The Legal Aid Society expresses its
grateful appreciation to the many agencies that have assisted in
this field.
The problems that have been presented to the Society may
be divided into four different groups: economic, family, property,
and "other". During the year 1949, 1,641 applicants were confronted with problems which, in one manner or another, affected
family relationships. Purely economic matters were presented in
991 instances, whereas 918 involved property rights. Approximately one-fifth of the applicants were confronted with problems
that could not be properly classified in these first three groups.
Slightly more than one-half of the applicants sought only advice.
Of all the problems presented to the Society by the applicants during the year, 1,086 were terminated without court action. 759
were referred either to attorneys on the reference panel or to
other agencies. 134 were terminated after court action, and 104
were rejected at first interview.
SOME LAWS HARSH WHEN APPLIED TO INDIGENTS

The experience of the Legal Aid Society during its first 25
years of operation has revealed that there are some laws of this
state which, although undoubtedly enacted in good faith in an
attempt to correct a then existing evil, have caused particular
hardship when applied to the indigent applicant for legal aid.
Serious thought should be given to the matter of remedial legislation to provide the very substantial number of persons relief from
what appears to be undue hardship under some of these existing
laws. Particular attention should be given to the present lien
act as it affects tenants as well as to the manner in which it is
enforced, to the existing attachment and exemption statutes of
this state, and to the matter of foreclosure and sale of personal
property under powers contained in chattel mortgages or conditional sales contracts together with subsequent deficiency judgments after foreclosure. These are the most urgent fields wherein
legislative amendment would seem to be needed for the relief of
families in the low income brackets. The problems which they
present (together with the criminal aspects of non-support) are
discussed more in detail in separate articles appearing in this
issue.
Many clients come to the offices of the Legal Aid Society with
hopeless situations arising from contracts entered into without
the advice of counsel. It would seem to be obvious, therefore, that
the work of the Legal Aid Society would be furthered through
any encouragement or publicity which is given to programs designed to impress upon the public the importance of seeking legal
advice prior to executing what may appear to be simple contracts.
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THE PROBLEM OF COMPELLING FATHERS TO
SUPPORT THEIR DEPENDENT CHILDREN
BERT M. KEATING
District Attorney of the Second Judicial District

The question of non-support of minor children, a felony in
the state of Colorado and in most other states, for many years has
been a perplexing and annoying problem for all district attorneys.
In many places throughout the United States, district attorneys
consider the matter as one of a civil nature and usually refer complainants back to private attorneys. In many jurisdictions the
prosecutor, having become discouraged as a result of the expensive and almost futile attempts to extradite deserting fathers from
many states, throws up his hands in disgust and refuses to do
anything.
The question of deserting fathers and the huge tax bill attached thereto, has now gained such enormous proportions that
schools, universities, social workers, taxpayer groups, and many
others, including the Congress of the United States, are finally
determined that it should have some attention.
The enormity of the problem can be ascertained by a glance
at the terrific cost, in dollars, to the taxpayers being expended
through Aid to Dependent Children, which is just one agency
affected. A very conservative estimate of that portion of moneys
expended for Aid to Dependent Children which is caused by deserting fathers is 49.5 per cent. This is the national average,
and in some districts the proportion is as high as 75 per cent.
Denver and Colorado are much below the national average figure.
Denver's budget for Aid to Dependent Children for the year 1950
amounts to $2,250,000. Jacob Zuckerman, Director of the National
Desertion Bureau, estimates that in America today there are more
than 250,000 wives and 750,000 children under the age of sixteen
years, who are the hapless victims of desertion. All forms of relief
for these unfortunates total about $205,000,000 a year.
This office, like the offices of all other district attorneys, has
been faced with this problem and has attempted to arrive at some
solution. In so doing, it has been borne in mind that in addition
to the huge tax bill involved, there is the certainty that many of
our juvenile delinquents come from broken homes in which there
are insufficient funds for the support, maintenance, and education of the children. I fully realize that my office is not a marital
center, and we do not proceed on the assumption that we can mend
broken homes. However, my experience has indicated that where
the father is forced to support the wife and children, there is a

December, 1950

DICTA

443

greater chance of the family being furnished at least some of the
necessities of life. This in turn. provides a greater chance for
better citizenship.
PROBLEMS ARISING FROM EXTRADITION

After much "trial and error experience," this office decided
upon a policy which, briefly, is as follows: When complaint is
made by a deserted mother; she is required to fill out and sign
a rather full questionnaire which gives us a history of the case.
If the deserting father has failed to support his family for only
a short period of time, or for some other reason which would
make obtaining a conviction an impossibility, we do not file the
criminal charge. We do, however, attempt to contact the father,
explaining to him his obligation to contribute something to his
family. In other words, we do not file cases unless it appears that
a conviction could be obtained if a trial were to ensue. If the
questionnaire discloses that the complainant has a good case, the
charge is filed, and the defendant is then arrested and taken into
custody. In about 90 per cent of the cases of this type the defendant has fled to some other state, and an extradition is necessary.
We then are confronted with the harsh rules surrounding the
extradition laws, one of which is the requirement that the defendant be personally present in the demanding state at the time the
offense was committed. A fact to be noted is that in approximately
50 per cent of the cases the absconding father was not in default
in his support at the time when he fled the jurisdiction of this
court. That automatically puts one-half of the defendants beyond
the reach of this office according to our extradition laws. However, 42 states, not including Colorado, have adopted the so-called
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act which does not require the
physical presence of the defendant in the demanding state at the
time the offense is committed. It has been held that even though
the demanding state does not have the law upon its books, it can
obtain the extradition of a wanted defendant if the asylum state
has the law in effect.' This office has used this Act, now has three
requests for extradition under this statute, and can see no reason
for any differential between cases of this type and others.
This law will no doubt be of great benefit to district attorneys attempting to extradite where the defendants were not physically present in the demanding state at the time of the commission
of the offense, but we are still faced with the reluctance of many
governors to extradite persons charged with non-support. It is
fundamental that governors cannot look into the merits of the
case and supposedly are limited to an examination of the extradition papers to see whether or not they are in proper form and
whether a crime has been committed. However, it has been my
1

Ex parte Morgan, 86 Cal. App. 217, 194 P. 2d 800 (1948).
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experience that many governors do not restrict themselves to their
rights and duties under the law, but through some sense of curiosity inquire into the facts. The complaining witness, not being
present at the hearing, is put to a great disadvantage, as the
defendant can concoct any excuse for not supporting his family
that his imaginative mind might create. He sometimes tells the
governor that the wife was unfaithful, that the child or children
are not his, or that he requested the wife to accompany him to
the asylum state. The complainant, not being present, cannot refute
these claims which in almost all instances are false. The governors
sometimes arbitrarily refuse to permit extradition, and of course
the state has no appeal from this decision. Frequently, when extradition is ordered, the defendant may institute further court
proceedings, usually in the form of habeas corpus, wherein his
story is likely to deviate far from the true facts. In some such
instances, the defendant convinces the court that he is an innocent
person or that the proceeding is an attempt merely to collect a
civil debt.
SUPERVISION WHILE ON PROBATION

When and if we finally obtain the custody of the defendant,
we permit him to file a plea of nolo contendere under the Probation
Act. 2 This plea is not tantamount to a plea of guilt in Colorado.
If the court accepts the plea, the defendant is permitted to make
application for probation which, if granted, contains a provision
that he will pay certain sums of money toward the support of his
family. This provision, after being approved by the court, then
becomes one of the terms under which probation is granted, and
the defendant is instructed in no uncertain terms that if he fails
to support his family, his probation will be revoked and he will
be sentenced to the penitentiary.
Mr. Frank Dillon, Chief of the Probation Department, handles all of these matters and supervises the collection and distribution of the money. This eliminates another one of the excuses
given by the deserting father: that he had mailed payments, but
had failed to receive receipts. If the defendant has a job or a
position in some other state, he is given permission to go to his
job or position and is made to report to the Probation Department
where he lives. If he remains in Denver, he is supervised by the
Denver Probation Department. Often the defendant claims that
he is unable to obtain work, and in such cases Mr. Dillon requires
that he appear at his office at 8:30 in the morning and again at
4:30 in the afternoon to report what efforts have been made to
obtain employment. His statements are checked by the Probation
Department to see if he is making a conscientious effort to get
2COLO.

LAWS, C. 195, p. 549 (1949).
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work. The timing of the defendant's appearance at Mr. Dillon's
office eliminates the possibility of the defendant lying in bed or
idling in taverns. If the defendant complains of being sick, he is
placed in the County Jail and there examined by the jail doctor.
It is surprising how effective this system has been in causing various excuses for not supporting families and children to disappear
into thin air.
As a result of this plan of prosecution, the following is a record of our accomplishments, and lack of accomplishments, in the
year starting September 3, 1949, and ending September 5, 1950:
N um ber of cases filed ..............................................................................
149
Cases dismissed ..........................................
7
Cases tried ...........................................................................................
2
Extraditions refused ................................................
11
Number of letters written where cases were not filed .................. 110
Average monthly interview s -----_-_-----------.............................................. . 60
Defendants on probation ..........................................................................
53
Probations revoked and sentences imposed ................................ 3
Average amount paid per month through Probation
Departm ent ......... .. .................................
........................... $2,647
Average amount received from letters per month ............................ $1,100
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

Another worth-while attempt to solve the problem is being
made through the so-called Uniform Support of Dependents Act,
which is in effect in eleven states, not including Colorado. Under
provisions of this Act, no state which does not have the legislation on
its books can receive its advantages. This Act is not of a criminal
nature and operates briefly as follows: The deserted wife makes
complaint to the proper court in the city of her residence concerning the failure of the father to support the children. Her statements and testimony are then transcribed and sent to the proper
court at the residence of the father, who is then served with a
summons to appear in the latter court. He then has the right by
deposition to cross-examine the mother of the children and to
tell his complete story to the court. The judge then enters an order
requiring the father to make certain payments for the support
of the children, and the court enforces its order through its power
to punish for contempt.
Many bills have been introduced in the U. S. House of Representatives and have been referred to the Judiciary Committee of
that body. Some of these bills provide that when the persons
charged with the non-support of minor children travel about in
interstate commerce, they shall be guilty of a federal criminal
offense, and certain penalties are attached thereto. Other federal
bills are civil in nature and seem to be based upon the theory
behind the Uniform Support of Dependants law. They permit either
an order of a state cburt to be made an order of the federal court,
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or an original order to be entered in the federal court, and failure
to comply with this order could invoke the power of the federal
courts to punish for contempt. Other bills of Congress combine
both the criminal and civil liability features.
The writer appeared as a witness before the Sub-Committee of the House Judiciary Committee last May, and also talked
with many other senators and representatives concerning federal
legislation regarding this vital subject. Every Representative and
Senator he talked to agreed that federal laws were advisable,
but the Department of Justice had complained about the additional
burden which would be thrown upon it if the offense were made
federal. Another objection raised was that the proponents of
such a law were attempting to turn the federal courts into courts
of domestic relations, whereas historically the problem was one
of a local nature.
The Federal Government has seen fit to attempt to control
the morals of the people on a national basis through the passage
of the Mann Act and has given comfort and aid to car owners
through the Dyer Act. If the Federal Government can lend its
strength and efforts in matters of this kind, certainly it can and
should lend its strength and assistance to a problem which has
become national in scope and with respect to which local prosecution has been made difficult because of state lines.
It is my contention that the only plausible solution to the
entire problem is federal legislation, for the following reasons: (1)
the great expense entailed in extradition proceedings; (2) the
harshness of the rules surrounding extradition, and the reluctancy
on the part of some governors to extradite in cases of this type;
(3) the natural fear of federal prosecution as compared to the
fear of state prosecution; (4) the greater ability of the Federal
Government to apprehend deserting fathers; (5) the fact that at
least one-half of the defendants in cases of this kind do move
about in foreign states; and (6) that the federal funds expended
in Aid to Dependent Children as a result of absconding fathers
has reached such a staggering figure that it has a great stake in
the results of this type of prosecution. This view concerning federal legislation is supported by many organizations and groups
including the District Attorneys' Association of Colorado.
Until such time as the Federal Congress recognizes the problem to be national in scope and assumes its responsibility, I would
suggest that the next Colorado legislature pass the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act and the Uniform Support of Dependents
law.
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THE LANDLORD'S LIEN IN COLORADO
GEORGE HOLDEN AND LEWIS EAGAN*

Mr. X, his wife and three children stepped out one afternoon
for the purpose of doing some shopping. Upon their return, Mr.
X found himself and family locked out of their apartment. Mr. X,
thereupon, went to the landlord who not only refused to allow
them to enter, but refused to permit Mr. X to remove even a few
clothes for the children until Mr. X had paid some eighteen dollars
of back rent. Whereupon, Mr. X withdrew, in great indignation, to
the offices of the Denver Legal Aid Sbciety-he was more than
confident that his legal rights had been abrogated, and that the
Legal Aid counsel would certainly assert those rights to the utter
and lasting confusion of the offending landlord.'
The reader might imagine the complete consternation of Mr.
X when he found that he had neither right nor remedy against the
landlord. Mr. X had not before been aware of the existence of that
piece of legislation known as the "Landlord Lien Statute"...
The plight of Mr. X is not unusual; in fact, the files of the
Denver Legal Aid Society are filled with such instances since the
enactment of the aforementioned statute, which reads as follows :2
... The keeper of any hotel, tavern, or boarding house, or any person
who rents furnished or unfurnished rooms or any owner or operator
of any apartment house consisting of rooms or suites of rooms rented,
furnished for the housekeeping purposes of the tenant shall have a
lien upon all the personal property of any kind then being upon the
rental premises belonging to his or her patrons, boarders, guests or
tenants, for such boarding, lodging or rent, and for all costs incurred
in enforcing such lien; provided, that the provisions of this section
shall not apply to stolen stock. The lien hereby given shall secure
obligations contracted for rent due in advance for thirty days in like
manner with obligations for the past use and occupation.

It is herein contended that this statute, as it is now being
used. and insofar as it creates a lien separate and distinct from the
traditional hotel and innkeepers' lien, exoresses an undesirable
policy in that it is unnecessarily harsh and places the landlord in
a preferred position over any other creditors. a position to which
he is not necessarily entitled. No reference is herein intended to
the hotel and innkeepers' lien. The latter lien has long been inherent in the common law for good and sufficient reasons.
The Legal Aid Society of Denver has found that the hardship
resulting from the now existing state of the law, under the aforesaid statute, is out of all proportion to the landlord's need for protection. The following sums were chosen at random by the Legal
* Students, University of Denver College of Law.
IThese facts are based on actual cases in the files of the Legal Aid

Denver.
2COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 101, § 1 (1935).
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Aid Society as representative of the sums for which tenants are
generally excluded from their apartments:
$ 6.50
18.00
27.68
6.80
2.14

$14.00
9.00
15.00
5.00
1.50

$12.00
1.75
5.00
25.00
30.00

$40.00
3.75
9.24
21.00
74.00

From the above figures, it is clearly apparent that the nresent
state of the law is very undesirable. Unfortunately, the Colorado.
Supreme Court has had no opportunity to clarify the law, nor does
it seem likely that the statute will be judiciallv interpreted. The
poverty of the very people most likely to be affected prevents any
of them from taking a case through an expensive appeal to a final
determination on its merits. Therefore, from a practical point of
view it appears that the undesirable aspects of this law can be
removed by legislative enactment alone.
An analysis of section one of the statute, supra. reveals no
express provision whereby a landlord has a legal right to exclude
a tenant without notice and by a summary proceeding. The procedural section of the statute speaks as of a time-after the tenant
has been excluded and property has been seized. 3 However, landlords have heretofore read into the section giving the lien, the
right to exclude, and have thereafter proceeded under the remedial
section in a purely summary manner. As of the date of this writing. the law has placed no impediment in the way of such arbitrary
action.
It is not herein advocated that the nresent lien should be entirely abolished. A reasonable and equitable lien statute is of great
advantage to the tenant in that such lien helps him get credit and
thus permits him to rent propertv when he could iiot otherwise
rent at all. Of course, such a lien is equally beneficial to the landlord.
ABSENCE OF EXEMPTION CLAUSE OBJECTIONABLE

One of the gravest objections to the present statute is the
absence of an exemption clause. The absence of such a clause.
together with the decision in the case of Noxon v. Glaze.4 seems to
render the present law contrary to the Constitution of Colorado.
The Noxon case held that inasmuch as the exemption statute provides only for exemptions in instances of attachment, levy of
execution, and distress for rent, and since the landlord lien is
neither an attachment nor a levy of execution, and since there is
no such remedy as distress for rent in Colorado. the landlord lien
is not subject to the operation of the exemption statute.
3

COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 101, § 3 (1935).
411 Colo. App. 503 (1898).
6 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 13-22 (1935).
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The writers feel that the opinion in the Noxon case is not
very well reasoned. The wording of the exemption statute clearly
indicates that the state legislature intended to include all the then
anticipated situations in which an exemption would be proper.
Therefore, the Noxon case draws too broad a distinction between
the remedy of distress for rent and the statutory lien. In distress
for rent, there is an existing right which ripens into a lien upon
the exercise thereof, that is to say, upon the seizure of the tenant's property. In the Landlord's Lien Act, the statute seems to
give a lien immediately upon the occupancy of the rental premises
by the tenant. Such, however, cannot be true for there may be
no present obligation upon which a lien can rest. There is, as in
distress for rent, an inchoate right in the landlord which springs
into being upon its assertion by the lienor. Clearly then, the statutory lien is in its very nature a lien which arises out of distraint.
The chief difference between the two forms of relief is that
one arose from the common law and the other by legislative act.
Such a distinction between them, to the extent of denying the
applicability of the exemption laws to the statutory right, seems
to be unwarranted and should not be allowed to stand.
A further criticism of the present statute is the preferential
position in which the landlord is placed in regard to other creditors
of the tenant. For example, a tenant may owe a substantial sum
for food, clothing, and hospital and doctor's bills. Yet, the landlord may seize and retain, without recourse, all of the personal
property of any kind on the rental premises belonging to the
tenant to secure a purely nominal sum.
QUESTIONABLE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE

The Colorado constitutional provision 6 for exemption laws
also presents a question. Is the provision mandatory or is it discretionary? We need not determine this, for the provision unquestionably sets out a public policy, and the Landlord Lien Statute,
in it's present form, is an abuse of legislative power contrary to
the public policy so set out in the constitution. The test was clearly
enunciated by Lurton. Circuit Judge, in the case of Jones v. Great
Southern Fireproof Hotel Co. 7 The learned judge, in discussing
the problem before him said:
... if,
powers
private
not the

however, this legislation is mere arbitrary exercise of the
of government, unauthorized by the established principles of
right, and not having the sanction of natural justice, it is
law of the land.

A statute which permits a tenant to be locked out and prohibits him from even entering to recover adequate clothing for his
children cannot have the authorization of principles of private
' COLO. CONST.,
Art XVIII, § 1. "The general assembly shall pass liberal homestead and exemption laws."
186 F. 370 (1898).
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right nor the sanction of natural justice. It may be conceded that
the General Assembly has the power to protect, by statute, the
right of a landlord to his rent. However, the means by which that
objective is reached under the Landlord Lien Statute are unreasonable, and the objective itself, although perhaps legal, is not equitable and is, therefore, undesirable.
THE LANDLORD'S LIEN IN OTHER STATES

The problem resulting from the fact situation outlined in the
example case prompted an extensive investigation of the statutes
of the several states. The results of this investigation may prove
to be worthy of consideration. The laws of the various states in
reference to a landlord's rights against his tenant fc7 overdue rent
fall into three generic groups.
Most States Have Only Innkeeper's Lien
The first is that group of states that either have no statutory
landlord's lien for rent or those which only have an ordinary
innkeeper's lien, confining said lien to the property of a guest of a
hotel, inn, boarding house, or rooming house. Such liens have no
application to the property of apartment house tenants, or to the
property of a tenant who occupies the premises as a home, as distinguished from the transient type of tenant who normally is the
guest of hotels, inns, boarding houses, and rooming houses. There
are 33 states 8 included in this classification. This means that
approximately 70 per cent of all the states do not provide the
apartment house landlord with a statutory lien for rent. The
reason that the innkeeper's lien is recognized in such states is the
peculiar relationship existing between the innkeeper and his
guests. The case of Horace Waters and Co. v. Gerard9 sets out this
relationship and its attendant rights and obligations as follows:
When the relationship of innkeeper and guest is established, the
innkeeper is bound to receive the guest and cannot inquire into the
guest's character and ability to pay the rent contracted for . . . and
it may be added that he is liable to his guest for the safekeeping of all
property brought upon the premises . . . corresponding to the extraordinary liabilities which the law imposes on the innkeeper is the
extraordinary privilege of a lien upon the effects of guests for the
amount of the reasonable charges for the guests' entertainment. [Emphasis ours].

The landlord of an apartment house who rents on a long term
basis is not subject to the extraordinary liabilities set out in the
quotation above. He may carefully choose his tenant and require
references which will establish such tenant's desirability and
financial qualifications. He is not liable to the tenant for the safe'Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New

Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
'189 N. Y. 302, 82 N. E. 143 (1907).
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keeping of the tenant's effects as in the case of the innkeeperguest relationship. To give such a lien to a landlord is to award
an extraordinary privilege without imposition of the extraordinary
liability which existed at common law. As previously indicated,
approximately 70 per cent of the state legislative assemblies have
not awarded such a privilege to date.
Some States Have Landlord'sLien With Exemptions
The second class of states consists of those which have given
the landlord of an apartment house a lien on the personal property
of the tenant, but which do allow certain items of personal property to be exempt from subjection to such lien. There are 11
states '0 having such statutes, and the specific items of exemptions
vary to a great extent. For example, Florida allows exemption
of all beds, wearing apparel, and $1,000 worth of additional personal property of the head of the family. It is apparent that Florida's statute is very liberal as far as the tenant is concerned. The
state of Oregon has a statute making all of the personal property
of the tenant, except wearing apparel, subject to the landlord's
lien for rent. The Oregon statute gives little relief to the tenant
since every item of personal property owned by the tenant except
wearing apparel is subject to said lien.
The other states in this group allow exemptions which are
less liberal than the Florida statute but not as harsh as the Oregon
statute. The statutes of these states have set out certain standard
exemptions of personal property. Among these exemptions are:
the working tools of the tenant's trade, wearing apparel, food on
hand, private papers, pictures, keepsakes, books, and other
private property which have intrinsic value to the tenant alone.
Those statutes that do not specifically set out these general exemptions in the context provide that all property exempt under
the states' exemption statute is also exempt from coverage by the
landlord lien statute. The state of Washington expressly excludes landlord's liens on the personal property of tenants of
dwelling houses, apartment houses, or other places used exclusively
as a home.
Liens With No Exemptions
The third category is that group of states which have a
landlord lien statute extending to the personal property of a tenant
of an apartment house, but which do not allow exemptions of any
kind. By virtue of these statutes, everything that the tenant owns
may be subject to the landlord's lien. Only four states fall within
this group. Those four states are Nevada, Nebraska, Alabama and
Colorado. One of these states, Alabama, has judicially interpreted
its statute as follows:"
10Arizona, District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Louisana, New Mexico, South Carolina, Utah, Texas, and Oregon.
,,Banks v. Windham, 7 Ala. App. 616, 62 So. 297 (1913).

DICTA

Vol. 27

The defendants, although they might have a valid debt against
the plaintiff and a lien on the furniture for unpaid rent, would not
have the right, against the plaintiff's [tenant's] objection and without
her consent, to take possession of the property without aid of legal
process.

In the above case the landlord's seizure of the plaintiff's furniture was held to be a conversion of the property. Such an action
on the part of the landlord would have been proper under the
Colorado statute as it exists, because the enforcing statute 12 only
requires certain proceedings to occur before sale and does not provide for any legal process prior to actually locking out the tenant
and taking over the tenant's property. The fact that legal process
prior to locking out the tenant is not resorted to in Colorado is
clearly exemplified by the many instances of such arbitrary actions
on record at the Legal Aid Society of Denver.
Undoubtedly it is more than mere coincidence that fewer than
10 per cent of the states have statutes which weigh the equities
so heavily in favor of the landlord of premises rented as an apartment or home. It is unfortunate that Colorado is one of four such
states.
EXEMPTIONS ARE NEEDED IN COLORADO

It is the writers' contention that a statute which enables a
landlord arbitrarily to lock out a tenant without resort to a legal
proceeding of any kind is unduly oppressive and inconsistent with
a person's constitutional right not be deprived of his property
without due process of law. The permissible means of detaining
a tenant's property under the Colorado statute seem unreasonable
and contrary to notions of natural justice.
We do not urge that a landlord of an apartment should not
have a lien upon the tenant's personal property. We merely urge
that our statute should be rectified in such a manner to provide
certain reasonable exemptions. For example, the working tools
of a man's trade, if withheld, will be of only slight benefit to the
landlord in an effort to satisfy his claim. Nor, does the landlord
achieve any justifiable end, when he withholds his tenant's personal papers, etc., which have no marketable value as security for
the rent that is due. What good can come from allowing a landlord to seize the uniform of a waitress whose ability to earn a
living depends upon the wearing and furnishing of such uniform?
This may seem to be a remote situation; neverthless, just such a
case is on record at the Denver Legal Aid Society.
In addition to the above stated reasonable exemptions, we
further contend that a statutory provision should be set up by
which a tenant might receive due notice of the attachment of the
lien, as well as the benefit of legal process prior to actual seizure
of his property by the lock-out method or otherwise.
2

COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 101, § 3 (1935).
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A DISCUSSION OF GARNISHMENT AND
ITS EXEMPTIONS
BRUCE KISTLER AND JACQUES A. MACHOL, JR.*

The problems arising from garnishment exemptions stem
from the fact that a statutory provision is highly unsuitable and
inflexible since the framers cannot anticipate the circumstances of
each and every individual. The statutory use of exemptions to
protect property owners and wage earners is antedated. Modern
legislation should be enacted in keeping with the present times and
to remedy the inequities presently existing and accruing under
today's statutes. Ever since states have used the method of statutory exemptions and garnishment to protect property owners and
wage earners, the legislatures have been forced by necessity and
pressure groups to change the exemptions from time to time. As
a result, the statutory exemptions in each state vary tremendously.
Exemptions apply generally to only two classes of rights:
namely, property (both personal and real) and income. The exemptions 1 concerning property generally center around protecting
the homestead and chattels such as wearing apparel, family pictures, one cow and calf, ten sheep, tools and implements, bicycles,
and sewing machines. Some states exempt automobiles from garnishment; Kansas, for instance, has an exemption from garnishment of one wagon. The supreme court of that state held in one
case that an automobile was a wagon. 2 The exemptions concerning
income generally center around totally exempting from garnishment insurance claims 3 pension benefits, 4 and veterans' bonuses. 5
There is a total absence of uniformity in the method which
states adopted to exempt income. Each state varies from the
other in either the exact amount or method of exemption. Connecticut, for instance, exempts $15 per week for general debts and
$25 a week if the debt is for room and board.6 New York, on the
other hand, allows attachment of only 10 per cent of an individual's
salary and permits only one execution at a time.7 Some states,
such as North Carolina 8 and Montana,9 exempt wages from garnishment for a certain number of days before levy of judgment.
Although some states, such as New Jersey, Louisiana, Missouri,
and oddly enough, Nevada, have no provision at all for exemption,
there seems to be a trend toward increasing the amount of exStudents, University of Denver College of Law.

COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 93 § 13, 14, 15, 23 (1935).

2 See also for general discussion on attachment of automobile in Colorado, Trout,
Exemption of Automobiles from Levyj under Execution or Attachment, 10 DICTA 143
(1933). Also People v. Corder, 91 Colo. 383, 15 P. 2d 621, cited in note 94 A.L.R. 301.
'CODE or ALA., Title 7. § 624 (1940).
4 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 93, § 17 (1935).
. SMITH-HURD ILL. STAT. ANN., C. 52, § 13

(1935).

'CuM.. SuPP. TO CONN. GEN. STAT., C. 299 § 1673c (1935).
THOM. LAWS N. Y., Part II, Civ. Prac.---Justice Ct. Act. § 300 (1939).
'N. C. GEN. STAT., C. 1, § 362 (1943).
REvIsED CODE MONTANA, Title 93 § 5816 (1947).
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emptions. The Colorado statute was amended in 1903, changing
the exemption from 50 to 60 per cent. 10 Alabama in 1949 rewrote
its statute, making 60 per cent of "wages due or to become due"
exempt." Alabama's change was from a former allowance of only
$25 a month which was a step in the right direction even though
imperfect in its remedy.
DIVERSITY OF INTERESTS MUST BE RECOGNIZED

How far should a legislature go in adopting statutory exemptions in garnishment? There is no answer in the state statutes
with their total lack of uniformity. In approaching garnishment
of the creditor, debtor, and emand exemption, the viewpoints
12
ployer should be analyzed.
The creditor feels that an unduly high garnishment exemption
heightens the "credit risk". The credit extended to a debtor must
be more carefully watched as the means of collecting the debt becomes more limited, and, of course, sales are thereby restricted.
Garnishment for the creditor is merely an attempt to salvage
himself from monetary loss on what might have been a profitable
deal. With a high exemption the possibility of salvage becomes remote. The realization from garnishment is frequently lost since
time spent, clerical work, and collection agencies each take their
share. In addition to this a customer is lost. The high exemption
"seriously impairs" the collection of just debts by garnishment of
wages.
Even if it were possible to collect the total debt, the return is
always extremely slow. The amount realized is always uncertain
because of the necessity of a number of executions. New York has
obviated this last unfavorable aspect by allowing only one execution, which remains effective until the debt is paid. 1 3 Conversely,
a low exemption statute affords the wage earner less limited credit,
but in turn reduces the effect of the exemption statute to a nullity
by offering the creditor little or no protection in case of the necessity for garnishment. The wage earner welcomes high exemptions.
and would obviously prefer to have his salary free from attachment. The statutes often divide wage earners into two groupsthose who are heads of families, and those who are not.
Generally the statutes, and Colorado's exemption statute specifically, 14 make no provision for the exemption of the wages of
single persons. Thus, the single individual may lose his entire
weekly, monthly, or yearly wage as a result of garnishment. There
is a good reason for the obvious omission of single persons from
STAT. ANN., c. 93, § 16 (1935).
CODE OF ALA., Title 7, § 624 (1940).
' For general and more exacting discussion see WVage-Exemption Statiutes-Garnishment Assignment of Wages, 11 NEB. L. B. 343 (1933).
IsTHOm. LAWS N. Y., Part TI, Civ. Prac.-Justice Ct. Act. § 300 (1929) ; New York
allows only 10 per cent of a salary to be attached, thus being one state with a high wage

1°CoLo.
"

exemption.

14 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93 § 16 (1935).
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the exemption statutes, in that a single, unattached person has
greater freedom of movement and can easily move from job to
job and from town to town. By virtue of the fact that the single
person is excluded from exemption, the creditor is given greater
protection of his claim. This rationalization, however, does not
console a hungry debtor.
As for the heads of families, the statutes which have a set
percentage of the salary exempt, such as Colorado's 60 per cent, are
only effective and fairly applicable to the middle and the highincome group. However, it is obvious that persons belonging to
these latter groups would not ordinarily be garnished. Moreover.
it is equally obvious that persons of the low-income group are more
likely to create debts which they cannot meet. It then follows that
the low-income group is the one which is most often affected by
garnishment proceedings against their wages. A 40 per cent re
duction in the take-home pay of a low-income individual with a
large family is more often than not disastrous.
EXEMPTING AMOUNT OF MONEY

On the other hand, a statutory exemption of a specific amount
of money, such as Maryland's $100 wage exemption, 15 protects
the low-income group but discriminates against a person of high
income. During an inflationary period the $100 exemption will
scarcely protect a debtor, while in a deflationary period the protection to the creditor is practically nil at the time it is needed
most. In this light the flexibility of the percentage wage exemption
seems to make it more effective for all parties than the frozen,
monetary exemption.
With respect then to the creditors' and the wage earners'
viewpoints, it may be said that a low exemption reduces the general
purpose of exemptions to a nullity, whereas a high exemption reduces the return to the extent that garnishment is practically useless. As a result of high exemptions the creditor requires other
collateral for the issuance of credit, thereby breaking down the
credit foundation of business. Under the present statutes it is a
question of who should be hurt, the creditor or the debtor.
The employer feels the effects of garnishment almost as greatly
as the debtor. The employer, as garnishee, is responsible to the
court "for any goods, chattels, choses in action, credits, money, or
effects of the defendant."' 6 He will have added expenses of book17
k~eping and often legal expenses in filing his answer in court.
No employer appreciates having the onus placed upon him by a
third party (creditor and court) for the debt of another individual;
the employer might prefer to discharge summarily the employee
who is a repeated debtor.
U'ANN.

CODE MD.. Art 9 § 33 (1949).

10 COLO. RULES CIV. PROC.. Rule 103

17Id Rule 103 (f).

(h).
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It is evident that garnishment, though not a pleasant device,
still is needed as a means of protecting the creditor and of keeping
the channels of business open and flowing. Nevertheless, it would
seem that there is a need for some other device to be used either
as an alternative or in conjunction with garnishment.
An attempted solution to the problem of garnishment of wages
is the Wage Earner's Plan of the Chandler Act,18 which became
effective in June, 1938. In brief, this is a plan available for a
debtor who desires to compromise or extend his obligations out of
his future earnings. He files a petition with the court for this purpose with his proposed plan for payment. The plan must be approved in writing by the majority in number and amount of all unsecured claims and the consent of all secured creditors whose claims
are to be materially affected by plan. A trustee is appointed by the
court to receive and distribute, subject to the control of the court,
all moneys to be paid under the plan. After the debtor has made
all payments called for by the plan, the debtor receives a discharge
from all debts covered by the plan. If, after three years have
elapsed, all payments have not been made, the court may grant a
discharge if it is convinced that failure to make the payments was
not occasioned by the fault of the debtor but was the result of
causes beyond his control.

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION FOR HIGH WAGE-EARNERS
The plan works well for persons who have enough assignable
wages to satisfy the creditors, but it will not reach the majority of
debtors. First, the wage earner who finds himself in debt to the
extent that his creditors must resort to garnishment probably does
not have enough income left after payment for the bare necessities to offer his creditors a very satisfactory plan of amortization.
If any such plan is rejected by the creditors, it must of necessity
fail, and the wages are still left open to garnishment as the only
remedy of the creditors. Furthermore, the cost to the debtor of
the protection afforded under the plan of the Chandler Act may
seem prohibitive since it involves a filing fee of $15 in addition
to an attorney's fee of probably not less than $25.
Several states have similar plans for personal receivorship
which are less complicated than that of the Chandler Act. 19 All
these plans embody essentially the same purpose, namely aid to
hard-pressed debtors in paying their debts.
Such a purpose is noble but unfortunately the plans appeal
to only one class of debtor as does the Chandler Act plan. The
low-wage earner must abandon the personal receivorship plan for
one of several reasons: (1) The exemptions, though as fair as
52 Stat. 930 et seq., 11 U.S.C. Ch. 13 (1940).
CoMP. LAWS § 15364-1 (1929), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.2441
GENERAL CODE § 11728-1; Wis. Rev. Stat. § 128.21 (1937).
"MICH.

(1937) ; ORIO
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the referee can make them, are still insufficient to support his large
family of dependents. (2) Sporadic employment may cause the
court to dismiss the proceedings for failure to meet the obligations
of the plan. (3) The debtors may throw in the towel and declare
bankruptcy, which is the very result the exemption statute in
garnishment and the personal receivorship plans try to avoid.
What remedy then is there available to the low-wage earner
which protects him from poverty or the stigma of bankruptcy, and
yet affords payment of his just debts to the creditor?
This enigma appears to be unanswerable as long as the wageearner's expense for necessities approaches his take-home pay and
as long as the dollar-down, dollar-a-week financing continues. A
workable solution to the problem is very earnestly sought by the
Legal Aid Clinics all over the nation.

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN COLORADO
In cooperation with Supreme Court and District Court
judges, the Judiciary and Legislative committees of the Colorado and Denver bar associations are presently working intensively on the development of a legislative program for
improvement of the state courts, which, it is hoped, will be
acceptable to the 38th General Assembly.
The January issue of DICTA will contain an explicit statement as to just what these legislative recommendations will
be. It is expected that they will follow pretty much along the
familiar lines of prior proposals to remove the constitutional
prohibition against increasing the salaries of judges while in
office, enhance the power of the Chief Justice in order that
he may have real superintending control over the state's
judiciary, and create an organization as a permanent part of
the state government to study and make recommendations aF
to necessary improvements in the courts. This issue will also
report any action by the Denver Bar Association on the proposal to increase the number and the salaries of the judges in
the Second Judicial District.
Be on the lookout for your January issue of DICTA for an
interesting and informative discussion on Judicial Administration in Colorado! Urge your legislators to support the bar
association program to improve the state's judicial machinery!

DICTA

Vol. 27

DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS-A NEED
FOR REVISION
GEORGE TORBICA AND IVAN FUGATE*

Since the field of deficiency judgments is so closely allied with
the broader field of chattel mortgages, any consideration of the
problems arising under the former must be linked to the two lines
of judicial authority concerning the effect of a chattel mortgage
upon the title of the mortgaged properties. The real problems
arising under deficiency judgments all seem to hinge upon the
determination of which party holds legal title to the property.
In Colorado, and some other states, the mortgage is seemingly
considered to be a conditional sale which allows the title to remain
in the mortgagee.' Other jurisdictions view the mortgage as only
a lien, with the title passing to the mortgagor until his default and
foreclosure. In Colorado, the fact that title is considered to rest
exclusively in the mortgagee enables him to repossess under the
terms of the ortgag e a
offe. the
tgaged securit..y f r
without recourse to the courts. This "bypassing" of our courts
presents the problem of whether or not the price received by the
mortgagee at the sale of the mortgaged security was a fair and
equitable one, for, in Colorado, the mortgagee is entitled to credit
the proceeds of the sale to the balance owed him by the mortgagor
and then sue for the deficiency. 2 Unless the mortgagor can show
retaken
bad faith in the conduct of the sale, the sale price of the
3
property will stand as the credit to which he is entitled.
Under the "equitable" rule, which prevails in other jurisdictions, the title to the property is in the mortgagor, and the only
way in which the mortgagee can repossess and sell the security
is to go into court and ask for a foreclosure of his lien. This brings
the sale within the purview of the court and affords an opportunity for setting standards both as to the conduct of the sale and the
determination of the fair value of the mortgaged security. It enables the court, for instance, to determine before sale what constitutes a fair price for the property. In Colorado, there can be
no such standards since the court is seldom aware of the sale until
it has already taken place. Due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information as to reasonable price of a chattel when repossessed, the court must content itself with stating that mere
inadequacy of the price obtained will not invalidate the sale.
Neither do the courts seem particularly concerned when it can be
shown that the chattel brought only a fraction of its true market
value. It is true that in the case of automobiles the court may require that the mortgagor be given credit for the NADA 4 "blue
* Students, University of Denver College of Law.

Chattel Mortgages In Colorado 1 (1935).
Id, at 37.
'Ramstetter v. McGinnis, 100 Colo. 494, 68 P. 2d 454 (1937).
4 National Automobile Dealers Association.
'HELLERSTEIN,
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book" value. However, those familiar with the NADA handbook
know that it seldom correctly reflects the actual market value in
any given locality.
There also seems to be little objection in this state to the sale
of the mortgaged security to wholesale dealers in the property.
Some jurisdictions, adopting a more realistic view of such practices, held otherwise. 5 It would seem that even in Colorado this
might be attacked on the ground that the mortgagee is obliged to
obtain the most reasonable value under the circumstances and must
of the highest possible
do nothing to interfere with the obtaining
bid for the benefit of the mortgagor.6
Probably the most harsh aspect of the chattel mortgage statute
as it applies to deficiency judgments is the practice of allowing the
"insecure" mortgagee to repossess the security almost at will. The
rule in Colorado seems to be that the mortgagee has the right to
determine for himself whether he is unsafe in his security, subject
must be exercised
to the rather vague limitation that his judgment
in "good faith and upon reasonable grounds."' 7 The injustices of
this rule are readily seen when it is pointed out that under the socalled "insecurity clause"' 8 the seller-mortgagee might well exact
a large down payment as well as a mortgage note from the mortgagor and then, within twenty-four hours, repossess and sell the
security. Again, the mortgagor would be compelled to accept the
amount obtained from the sale-of the security as a credit against
the total of the note and might conceivably have to pay a deficiency
judgment even though he had had the use of the property for only
one day! In short, the mortgagor is completely at the mercy of
the mortgagee. And all because of our insistence upon following
an antiquated interpretation of the effect of a chattel mortgage!
APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE RULE

While it is to be admitted that the problem of preventing
people from buying what they cannot afford defies present solution,
many strides have been made in other states in an effort to reduce
the adverse effects of repossession, re-sale, and deficiency awards
on persons of reduced means. These jurisdictions follow the
"equitable" view that the mortgage is only a lien; title remaining
in the mortgagor until foreclosure. It might seem at first blush
that we have strayed far afield from the specific subject of deficiency judgments; however, extensive research seems to indicate
that the source of most injustices perpetrated upon the debtormortgagor is in the interpretation in various jurisdictions of the
effect a mortgage has on ownership of the mortgaged security. For
in those states where it is considered that the mortgagee has legal
title to the property, there seem to be fewer legal obstacles to the
mortagee's retaking his own property, and selling it at his own
pleasure.
5 Universal credit Co. v. Uhri, 101 S. W. 2d 501 (Mo. App., 1937).

a Colorado Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Navins, 82 Colo. 130, 257 P. 357 (1927).
T Thomas v. Beirne, 94 Colo. 429, 30 P. 2d 863 (1934).
S HELLERSTEIN, 0P. Cit., supra, at 39.
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States following the so-called "equitable" rule recognize
merely a lien by the mortgagee in the security and logically require that the repossession and sale be conducted under the watchful eye of both the court and the defaulting mortgagor. Louisiana,
which follows the latter rule, provides, in all foreclosure actions,
for the appointment of three appraisers. One of the appraisers is
selected by the mortgagor, and the other two are chosen by the
district judge having jurisdiction over the property. They are
required to make a personal examination of the property that is
appraised and by formal, authentic act, before a notary or clerk
of court, an inventory is prepared setting forth the reasonable
value of such chattels. In all cases, the appraisers appointed are
disinterested parties and at least fairly familiar with the property
they are called upon to appraise. 9 The Attorney General of Louisiana, in passing on the situation which arises when the mortgagee
waives appraisement and proceeds with the sale, has stated the
rule to be that, where a mortgagee or other creditor takes advantage
of a waiver of the right of appraisement, the sale discharges the
debt and the creditor thereafter has no right to proceed against
th dphtor nr hig ot.her pronprtv fnr nnv rpmaining doionou lO
In the case of Home Finance Service v. Walmsley,1' the Louisiana
Appellate Court stated that a creditor who had disposed of the
debtor's pledged automobile without appraisement and credited the
proceeds on the debtor's note could not thereafter maintain suit for
recovery of the remaining deficiency. The rule in Louisiana permits the security to be valued at close to "market value" and does
not indulge in vague references to "reasonable value under the
circumstances," a phrase finding common usage in our Colorado
courts.
IOWA RULE
Although the rule which obtains in the Iowa courts does not
provide as much protection to the debtor, it still seems infinitely
superior to the rule in Colorado. Thus, under the Iowa Code,
which adheres to the theory that only a lien is created in the mortgagee, it is held that personal property which is levied upon and
advertised for sale on execution must be appraised before sale by
two disinterested members of the community, one of whom shall
be chosen by the execution debtor and the other by the creditor.
If no agreement can be reached in the selection, the levying officer
may select the appraisers. The appraisers shall then return a just
appraisement if they can agree; if they cannot agree, they shall
choose another disinterested citizen and with his assistance shall
complete the appraisal. When offered for sale, the property shall
not be sold upon the first offer for less than two-thirds of said valu'La. Acts 1934, No. 28.
10Opinions of Attorney General 1934-1936, p. 633.
11 176 So. 415 (La. App., 1937).
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ation. If offered for three successive days at the same place and
hour of day as advertised and no bid is received equal to two-thirds
of the appraised value thereof, it can be sold for one half of said
valuation. Only when the above conditions have been met and a
deficiency still exists after the sale of the property may the judgment holder order out another execution for the balance remaining.
True, it may be argued that the provision for the sale of the
mortgaged chattel at anywhere from one-half to two-thirds of its
appraised value actually allows the buyer an opportunity to purchase the article for two-thirds and no more. However, the sale is
still conducted under the careful scrutiny of the court and providing the sale is not one to which only dealers in the commodity
familiar with the two-thirds provision are invited, the mortgagor
still has a fighting chance to obtain a bid from a private individual
for full market value. Thus, although "market value" for the
mortgaged security is not a certainty, at least the sale is conducted
on a fair and reasonable basis and under the supervision of the
court. It will also be noted that provision is made for advertising
the date and nlace of sale, a provision omitted from the Colorado
rule. The entire procedure eliminates the possibility of collusion
between mortgagee and purchaser which exists in Colorado. and
the mortgagor is at least assured that he will not be subjected to
an unreasonable deficiency judgment merely because of a grossly
inadequate sale price.
NEED FOR REVISION IN COLORADO

After having viewed the procedure followed in Louisiana and
Iowa, two of many states with similar rules, it should be apparent
that our Colorado rule is sadly in need of revision. Certainly it
cannot be denied that a real problem exists in the instance of the
man of moderate means who purchases an automobile, makes a
down payment of several hundred dollars, signs a note with an
exorbitant interest rate, then defaults after one or two payments,
has his chattel repossessed and sold for a sum considerably less than
the original purchase price. He then finds himself legally obligated
to pay a deficiency judgment that in effect charges him an utterly
fantastic sum for the use of the car for only a short time. The
Denver Legal Aid Society is constantly confronted with similar
problems, most of which with the same unfortunate results. The injustice does not end there. Too often, it happens that the person
who purchases the mortgaged security at the sale is the original
seller who. after purchasing the automobile at a ridiculously low
figure, manages somewhat miraculously to sell it again at a substantial profit. Thousands of dollars are often made from the sale
of one automobile through this same procedure.
It must be noted that the primary stumbling block in Colorado
to an effective handling of deficiency judgments is our adherence
to the outmoded legal fiction that in cases of sale with a chattel
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mortgage note, the title remains in the mortgagee. As long as we
continue to operate under this rule, the means of regulating the
repossession and sale of a mortgaged chattel will not be adequate
to effect any great reduction in the number of debtors who are
forced into a lifetime of debt and economic hardship because of
a deflated sale price of the mortgaged chattel and the consequent
grossly exaggerated deficiency remaining. However, because of the
tremendous political power of those interested in retaining our
present system, it is doubtful that any legislative remedy can be
obtained at this time. It may well be that the answer lies in making
the courts aware of all the facts in these problems which have only
infrequently been brought before them. If our courts could be convinced that the man who purchases an automobile or refrigerator,
defaults after a few payments and returns the article in substantially the same condition he originally purchased it, should be allowed a credit for the original sale price minus reasonable depreciation, the deficiency judgment then allowed would be no more than
the debtor deserves for his default, and our problem would be on
its way to solution.

BEYOND INSTITUTES, WHAT?-A PROGRAM
FOR TOPICAL LUNCHEONS
ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT
of the Denver Bar

Together with many other lawyers, I have learned a great
deal from the institutes which have been conducted by the Colorado and Denver Bar Associations. Such institutes probably offer
the best means of imparting general information quickly and
efficiently. I have been conscious, however, both as a spectator
and as a participant in panel discussions, that many of the listeners leave the institutes with unanswered questions. Often these
questions relate not merely to isolated or unique transactions, but
rather they involve problems which recur over and over again.
The experience of other lawyers in dealing with these particular
problems would be most helpful if that experience could be shared.
I have a most profound respect for the aggregate knowledge
residing in a group of lawyers on any problem that can be conceived. It is unfortunate that there has been almost no svstematic
way in which such joint knowledge could be shared. Time and
time again lawyers who specialize in particular fields, and who are
participating in institutes, find that there are members of the
audience who know much more about a particular topic than the
so-called expert. In the conduct of an institute, that specialized
knowledge in the audience ordinarily cannot be made available to
the group. In order to cover the ground, an institute cannot make
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much use of audience participation. There simply is not enough
time to explore the various facets of the problems which are discussed. In order for a group to obtain the benefit of specialized
and detailed information, some different sort of meeting should
be developed for this purpose.
Then, too, many lawyers find it difficult to take a day, or even
a half day away, from the office to attend institutes given by lawyers who are specialists in their particular fields. It is probable
that lawyers generally could not take time from normal office
hours to attend any kind of group meetings. Most of us, however,
do not find it too difficult to attend luncheon meetings. Perhaps
luncheon meetings could be arranged, ending at 1:30, which would
provide approximately an hour for discussion of particular topics.
To propose specific topics; perhaps a meeting could be arranged at which the relative advantages of agreements for sale and
purchase of real estate could be compared with the use of trust
deeds. Perhaps another session might deal with the various clauses
which lawyers insert in the regular printed forms of agreements
for sale and purchase. Other sessions might deal with problems
peculiar to quiet title suits, estate proceedings, etc. All of you will
immediately think of many other fields of law in which other
specific problems peculiar to those fields could be discussed. Naturally, my thinking is along the lines of real estate law, but there is
no reason why such a technique should not be adopted to negligence
law, contracts, corporations, etc.
FREE SPEECH AT LAST!?

These meetings could be presided over by a moderator who
would merely introduce the topic for discussion. Each member
would have the inherent right to speak on the topic, to present his
draft of a clause, or to ask a question. This particular point would
be the unique feature of these meetings. The inherent right of
every member of the audience to speak would afford an opportunity to obtain answers to the bottled-up questions which always
survive any group meeting.
In order to insure an opportunity for each member to be
heard, it would probably be necessary to limit the attendance to a
group composed of the first thirty, or less, who make reservations.
Even with an hour available, this would give each one only two
minutes in which to speak his piece. If this plan is to supplement
the institutes and other group activities, however, it is vital that
there be preserved to each member the absolute right to be heard
on the topic being discussed. The participants would be invited to
bring their own forms, where documents are being discussed,
and each would share with the group his method of answering
the particular problem involved. I believe that meetings of this
kind would be extremely helpful in securing better draftsmanship
of documents and in keeping us abreast of the latest developments.
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Every lawyer who has had some years of experience in practice, recalls most vividly how much he had to learn when he first
began to practice. All of us have been very grateful to older lawyers who have generously answered our questions. The young
lawyers beginning practice today are still dependent upon older
lawyers for advice and help. The bar has been giving much study
and attention to some sort of an apprentice system to help law
school graduates to become adjusted to the actual practice of law.
Group meetings of the kind here proposed could be of great help
to younger lawyers. At each meeting a half dozen or so places could
be reserved for lawyers who had been admitted to practice less
than two or three years. These young lawyers, by attendance,
would hear a discussion of common problems by older lawyers.
They would actually hear the clauses used in particular documents,
and be warned of the pitfalls involved in various fact situations.
By this method it seems to me that the accumulated axperience of
the group would be made available not only to older practitioners,
but also to help the young lawyer to learn the exact and detailed
methods by which practical problems are solved. Such a plan
might provide a vicarious apprenticeship.
Individual lawyers do not have the time or facilities to initiate
and carry on such a program. It is my belief that the bar association could render a real service to the profession by arranging such
meetings. Some preliminary discussion has been had with the
officers of The Denver Bar Association and it is hoped that the
members will soon receive a notice advising them of the time, the
place and the topic of the first meetings. As you will realize, the
attendance must be kept small enough to operate efficiently, and
it probably will be some time before all those interested in participating in such a workshop luncheon will get a chance to do so.

THE BOOK TRADER'S CORNER
Spurgeon and Sutton, Exchange National Bank Bldg., Colorado Springs list the following law books for sale: 1 set of Am. Jur.,
Vols. 1-12 ALR 2d with current digest, 1 set Colorado Digest, Vols.
100-120 Colorado Reports, and complete set of Corpus Juris with
Cyc.
Hugo P. Remington, CU '09, who is now a county judge in
Lisbon, N. D., writes that his county has authorized the sale of
the following state reports from his library: Colorado 1-6, California 1-63, Idaho 1, Oregon 1-10, Kansas 1-29, Montana 1-3, Nevada 1-16, New Mexico 1-2, Utah 1-2, Washington 1, and Wyoming 1-2.
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SURVEY INDICATES REAL INCOME OF
COLORADO LAWYERS LESS THAN IN 1940
DONALD S. STUBBS
Chairman of the Economic Survey Committee of the Colorado Bar Association

Between 1940 and 1949 there was only an increase of 7% in
the real income of Colorado lawyers, according to the report recently made by the Economic Survey Committee. If these figures,
gathered by means of the questionnaire distributed last summer
to all bar association members, were "after taxes" then we would
find that in 1949 the real earnings of most Colorado lawyers were
less than in 1940.
The latter year was the "normal year" selected by a previous
committee for a similar survey. These 1940 figures, together with
the findings of the U. S. Department of Commerce's recent study
which yielded 1947 income figures for Colorado lawyers, have
been used as standards with which the current survey is compared.
The per capita income payments for all people in Colorado were
also used as a standard of comparison, and it was found that
whereas there was an increase between 1940 and 1947 of 176% in
the Colorado per capita income, during the same period Colorado
lawyers' incomes arose only 53%.
In deriving the income figures for Colorado lawyers for 1949,
the present Economic Survey Committee utilized 811 of the replies
received as a result of the 1343 auestionnaires mailed out to the
association membership in June. This was a very high rate of return and yielded a most satisfactory sample, far greater than is
regarded as necessary for such purpose by most statisticians. The
total of 811 includes 103 returns from cities having a population
of less than 5000, 194 from cities ranging in population from 5,000
to 25.000, and 514 from cities with more than 25,000 population.
Both mean and median income figures are available as the
result of the current survey, as well as from the 1947 study of the
Department of Commerce. The mean income is equal to the sum
of all of the incomes divided by the number of income recipients,
whereas the median income is that income below which and above
which half of all the income recipients fall. The use of only the
mean, or average, income is misleading because the presence of a
relatively small number of high incomes or large losses causes the
mean to be disproportionately higher or lower, as the case may be,
and out of line with the majority of incomes. Thus, the use of a
median figure gives a truer picture of the majority's situation. The
very excellent 1940 survey used only mean income figures, but
Mark H. Harrington, chairman of the committee and author of the
article in DICTA describing the survey, achieved somewhat the
same result as a median income figure by eliminating five incomes
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"which seemed disproportionately large for the classifications
under which they came", thus arriving at an adjusted overall
average of $3,031.00 for the Colorado lawyer.'
The following table shows the results for 1949 derived from
the current survey and compares figures for the entire state with
the results of the earlier studies, all measured against the purchasing value of the dollar:
NET INCOME OF COLORADO LAWYERS BEFORE TAXES

Mean
Cities under 5,000
(103 returns) ................ 5,660.49
Cities 5-25,000
(194 returns) ................ 5,715.89
Cities over 25,000
(514 returns) ................ 7,885.54
Entire State
(811 returns) ............ 7,083.95
Purchasing Value of Dollar
(Cons mers Pri

-Jan.

Median

1940
Adjusted
Mean
Median

1947

1949
Mean

5,000.00
5,054.10
6,019.00
5,413.22

5,785.00

4,643.00

3,031.00

e Tnd ev

1939 dollar=100c)

59c

61c

98c

It is thus noted that the median net income in 1947 was 53 per
cent greater than the 1940 income, and that the median net income
in 1949 was 78 per cent greater than the 1940 figure. But in terms
of the 1940 dollar, the $5,413.00 median income for 1949 was approximately $3,240.00, only a 7 per cent increase in real income.
Since these figures are all net income before taxes, the latter gain
melts away when cognizance is taken of the tremendous increase
in taxes during the period.
Another standard of comparison made by the committee was
to measure the Colorado mean and median against that for the
entire country. Such figures are not available for the same year
of 1949, but in 1948 the mean net income for all lawyers in the
United States was $8,315.00 and the median net income was
$6,336.00. It was this mean net figure which was given such widespread and misleading publicity in the nation's press. These U. S.
figures of $8,315 and $6,336 are to be contrasted with the Colorado figures of $7,083.95 and $5,413.22 for the year of 1949.

NEW PATENT SECTION OFFICERS
New 1950-51 officers for the Patent Section of the Colorado
Bar Association are H. B. Van Valkenburgh, chairman; Victor C.
Muller, vice-chairman; and Carle Whitehead, secretary-treasurer.
Correspondence with the section should be directed to the secretary-treasurer at 709 Kittredge Bldg., Denver.
1 20 Dicta 1, 16 (Jan. 1943).
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PROGRESS REPORT ON DENVER'S MUNICIPAL COURTS
The newly-created Small Claims Division of Denver's Municipal Courts seems to have become a thriving operation. In the three
months of its existence more than three hundred cases have been
heard and disposed of in this "attorneyless" court. From all indications, this court will continue to grow. More and more small
businesses, such as groceries and neighborhood cleaning establishments, are contacting this court to determine the feasibility of attempting to collect small delinauent accounts which would otherwise
be written off as bad debts. Several such businesses, which have
been using this service for the last six to eight weeks, report that
results are far above expectations.
Recognition of the need for this court and the size of its operation has already been received from the Denver City Council and
Denver's administration. After January 1, 1951, a new municipal
judgeship has been promised to assume the burden of this court,
as well as to relieve the already overloaded dockets in the other
divisions. This will be one of the many improvements in the services offered to the public and to the attorneys wherever possible at
the municipal and justice court level.
Consistent with the desires of Denver's city administration
and its municipal judges to extend better services where possible,
the judges constantly have been studying the state statutes under
which the justice courts and also the small claims court operate,
with the end in view of recommending changes in statutes which
would permit smoother operation with a minimum amount of detail. At a recent meeting of the municipal judges of Denver, it was
suggested that a request be made of the Denver and Colorado bar
associations to study the needs and recommend changes to the next
General Assembly. The judges unanimously agreed that better
service could be rendered by Denver's justice courts if changes
could be effected in the statutes in the following situations in cities
with a population in excess of 100,000:
1. Service of summons in the justice courts and small claims
court by anyone over the age of 18 and not a party to the action.
2. A change in the sections relating to the duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of constables in cities where multiple divisions
of the justice courts are operating with a consolidated clerks'
office. The present statute is satisfactory in counties where the
constable is elected. However, when appointed by the court and
acting under orders of the court, it is felt that the present statute
vests too much discretionary authority in the constable to determine
whether or not he will perform a court order. It often results in
internal problems which could be avoided if the discretionary
authority and subsequent responsilibity for the actions were placed
upon the court.
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3. A statute permitting city councils to establish the forms
used in the justice courts and the manner and procedure of maintaining dockets and records. It is felt that this type of statute could be the basis to effect the long-needed changes in simplifying forms used in the justice courts.
4. A general revision of the small claims statute patterned to
cover difficulties and problems which have arisen as a result of
actual operation; i.e., corporations as parties litigant, counterclaims, service of notice in counter-claim, substituted service, costs
for special service, and procedure after judgment with coverage
on stipulated judgments and confession judgments.

ARE YOU A SPEAKER WITHOUT AN AUDIENCE?
IF SO, REGISTER BELOW!
The Denver Bar Association is a member of the Adult Education Council which operates the Denver Speakers Bureau. Frequent call is made on the latter for interesting and informative
speakers by clubs and organizatinns nf Pvrv- type and description.
The audiences involved are often small and there are no
honorariums, but members of the association who fancy themselves
as orators and have an interesting story or stories to tell are urged
to fill in the blank below and mail it to the secretary's office, 319
Chamber of Commerce Bldg. The registrations thus received will
be turned over to the Speakers Bureau for use in the busy winter
lecture season just getting underway and hence forth until withdrawn.
Many lawyers already are registered with the bureau by reason of some extra-curricular activity or organization, but if you
are not on their rolls, and would like to take a crack at being a
hometown spellbinder, make haste to return the registration blank
below or a reasonable facsimile thereof.
SPEAKERS BUREAU REGISTRATION
N am e: .......................................................................

Occupation: Attorney

H om e address: ........................................................

H om e phone: ........................

Business address: ............................................... Business phone: ...................
Fields in which you are capable of speaking: ..................................................
T itles of speeches: ---------------------------------------Content: ...................................

1. .............................................................
................................

. ..............................................................
................................
S.

........................................................................................
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION
BY ALBERT J. GOULD AND KENNETH L. SMITH
of the Denver Bar

DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSES BY CORPORATE EMPLOYEES

In Henricks, TC Memo, 11-8-49, a salesman was allowed to
deduct expenses made by him out of pocket for which he was not
reimbursed. Although he was employed by a corporation, it was
within the purview of the contract of employment that he should
make said expenditures and his salary was established upon that
basis.
The court found: "There are many expenses incidental to
selling which the salesman is not expected to recover from the
Company on top of his salary . . . Mangement does not expect an

expense account to contain every phone call, every taxi ride, every
luncheon, and every drink bought by a salesman in the course of
his business, and social existence."
The above decision is important because the Bureau ordinarily
insists that expenditures made by a corporate officer out of his
funds are not deductible.
NEW TAX BILL

One of the most important provisions of the new 1950 tax
bill permits complete liquidation of a corporation in any month in
the year 1951, subject to certain conditions which should be studie
carefully.
Briefly, complete liquidation of a corporation in any month of
the year 1951 may be accomplished if the earned surplus account
is treated as a dividend. In many cases, the income tax to be paid
on the earned surplus account treated as a dividend will be much
less than the capital gains tax, which is postponed until the assets
received in liquidation are disposed of.
NEW EXCESS PROFITS TAX-MAYBE NOT

The Bureau of Internal Revenue opposes a new excess profits
tax because of difficulty of administration and because it is inflationary and promotes extravagance by corporations subject to the
tax. The President's counsel of economic advisors is inclined to
agree with the Bureau.
It seems likely that increased corporate tax rates, at least on
larger corporations, may be adopted in lieu of excess profits tax.
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REFUND AFTER WAIVER

Section 322, IRC, has been amended to grant the taxpayer the
same time to file claim for refund as the Commissioner has to
propose a deficiency after waiver of the statute of limitations by
the taxpayer.
THIN CORPORATION

In Isador Dobkin, 15 T. C. No. 6, a doubtful decision, the Tax
Court in effect transferred to capital a payment by the taxpayer to
the corporation which the taxpayer intended should be a loan. If
sustained, this decision would establish the principle that a large
disproportion between debt and risk capital in a new corporation
is improper. There is no statute to sustain this conclusion.
This most unusual decision should be studied carefully by any
attorney contemplating incorporation of a company with small
invested capital in which a large debt or loan is to provide capital
known to be necessary at the time of incorporation. We believe
this decision turns upon facts not ordinarily present in the organization of a small closed corporation.

FROM THE EDITOR'S MAIL BAG
Hon. Floyd F. Miles, D. J. (Ret.)
State House, Secretary,
The Colorado Board of Law Examiners.
Dear .Sirrah:
Herewith is a letter from one Mr. X inquiring as to the possibilities of
being admitted to the Colorado bar on a correspondence school diploma. The
merits of his case I leave to your infinite wisdom, but I would have you note
that his letter was forwarded to me from Miss Merritt of the National Conference of Bar Examiners. Evidently she is unaware that you, Sire, are the
Lord High Executioner on bar admission requirements. And thus we have
Merritt to Miller to Miles, which, at least alliteratively, is far superior to that
old baseball combination Somebody to Evers to Chance.
Respectfully yours,
W. B. MILLER.
W. Miller, Esquire,
Plenipotentiary Extraordinary Without Portfolio,
Colorado Bar Association.
My Dear William:
Had you devoted your life to the acquiring of ignorance in baseball lore,
you could not have graduated with higher honors. The man's name was "TINKER" T-I-N-K-E-R. Write that down so you will not forget it. "Tinker to Evers to
Chance."
Concerning Brother X who wishes to become a lawyer by way of a correspondence school of law: He doesn't sound promising to me, although he might
develop into pretty fair material for a Bar Association Secretary. I shall write
to him and suggest that he stick to the Real Estate business, since in that way
he can, and no doubt will, follow the path carved by his associates in the business and practice law without the necessity of going to college and taking the
bar examination.
Believe me, Sir, your most humb'l and ob'dt ser'vt,
FLOYD F.

MILES.
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TEN YEAR REVIEW OF COLORADO LAW
There has been so much demand for the mimeographed materials distributed at the convention institute on the Ten Year
Review of Colorado Law that the bar association office has had to
have several reruns made. The materials are now bound together in one attractive volume and may be secured from the
secretary, 319 Chamber of Commerce Bldg., Denver 2, Colo., for
the price of $2.00 per copy.

PERSONALS
The Denver Bar Association sustained a great loss on October
30 with the unexpected death of Arthur H. Laws. Another wellknown member of the Denver association who passed away recently
was Edgar C. Craft, who died on November 21.
James T. Locke of Canon City, recently awarded an Honorary
Life Membership for over 50 years service at the bar, died on
October 21.
The Colorado bar was also saddened in November by the passing of the Hon. Paul L. Littler of Grand Junction, judge of the
District Court for the Seventh Judicial District. Although he had
been ailing for some time, Judge Littler continued to work hard
in keeping up on his court docket and taking an active part in the
affairs of the District Judges Association, as well as in the state
bar association.
Philip A. Rouse, James Q. Hammond and Earl H. Johnson, all
of Denver, and Earl Wolvington of Sterling, are some of the Colorado lawyers who have recently been called back into the service.
Francis A. Benedetti, formerly of Fort Morgan, recently announced the opening of an office in Yuma.
Richard H. Shaw, formerly located in the First National Bank
Bldg., Denver, and Louis I. Hart, Jr., formerly in the Equitable
Bldg., Denver, have moved to new offices at 414 Denver National
Bank Bldg.
A stained glass memorial window in the Crown Hill mausoleum has been dedicated by Mrs. J. D. Brawner and Mrs. W. H.
Lowther to the memory of their brother, John Q. Dier, former
member of the Denver Bar Association, who died last year.
As a result of recent examinations, Arthur A. Brooks, Jr.,
member of the Colorado bar, has been admitted to practice in California. Mr. Brooks has opened offices at 915 N. La Cienega, Los
Angeles 46. He is also maintaining his Denver office in the C. A.
Johnson Bldg.
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